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Abstract 
As the conception of and debates on regional powers have been led by political science, this pa-
per aims to contribute to the discussion from an economics perspective. Based on the discussion 
of different concepts of economic power—such as those of Schumpeter, Perroux, Predöhl, or 
Kindleberger—concepts of technological leadership, and the global value chain approaches, the 
paper develops a research framework for the economics of regional powers. This framework is 
then tested using descriptive statistics as well as regressions analysis, with a focus on the four 
regional powers Brazil, China, India, and South Africa. As economic power is relational, the re-
lationship of regional powers to other nations in the region is analyzed. 
According to the findings, only limited statements on the economics of regional powers are 
possible: a regional power can be described as an economy with a relatively large population 
and land area which plays a dominant role in trade within the region and in the regional 
governance. The regional power develops its technological capacities, and its businesses act 
regionally and globally with increasing strength. 
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Zusammenfassung 
Zur Ökonomie regionaler Mächte:  
Ein Vergleich zwischen China, Indien, Brasilien und Südafrika 
Während Konzeption und Debatte über regional powers maßgeblich von politikwissenschaft-
licher Forschung geprägt sind, leistet das Working Paper einen Beitrag zur Theorie der re-
gional powers aus wirtschaftswissenschaftlicher Perspektive. Ausgehend von der Diskussion 
unterschiedlicher Konzepte wirtschaftlicher Macht (beispielsweise von Schumpeter, Perroux, 
Predöhl und Kindleberger), Konzepten zu technologischer Führerschaft und der Forschung 
über globale Wertschöpfungsketten wird ein Forschungsrahmen für die wirtschaftswissen-
schaftliche Analyse der regional powers entwickelt, der im Folgenden durch beschreibende 
Statistik und Regressionsanalyse an den Beispielländern Brasilien, China, Indien und Südaf-
rika getestet wird. Da wirtschaftliche Macht ein relationales Konzept ist, wird die Beziehung 
der regional powers zu anderen Ländern der jeweiligen Region untersucht. Anhand der Er-
gebnisse sind begrenzte Aussagen über die Ökonomie der regional powers möglich: Eine re-
gional power kann demnach als eine Volkswirtschaft mit verhältnismäßig großer Bevölkerung 
und Landfläche beschrieben werden, die eine dominante Rolle im Handel der Region und 
der regionalen governance-Struktur einnimmt. Die regional power entwickelt ihre technologi-
schen Fähigkeiten weiter und ihre Unternehmungen agieren mit zunehmender Stärke so-
wohl auf regionalem als auch auf globalem Niveau. 
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1 Introduction 
What is a regional power? Is the United States of America a regional power? Is Germany a 
regional power? Can a country like Nigeria be a regional power? How far does the power of 
regional powers reach? How can one measure the political and economic power of regional 
powers?1 What is a region? I define regions as geographical, economic, and political entities 
that have come into being over time and which are viewed in very different ways (Gode-
hardt and Nabers forthcoming 2011). I assume that regions can be distinguished, from an 
economics perspective, by regional integration agreements; that is, there exist customs un-
ions, free trade zones, or even joint markets and political integration. In this contribution, I 
use the term region in a more narrow sense: as economic and political cooperation and inte-
                                                     
1 I would like to thank Joachim Betz, Nadine Godehardt, Dirk Nabers, Detlef Nolte and Cordula Tibi Weber for 
their helpful comments on previous versions of this paper. Thanks also go to Toman Omar Mahmoud for the 
construction of the regression analyses. 
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gration. For the paper’s empirical analysis, however, the term is interpreted in another way: 
as the continent where the particular power acts. More precise classifications may be neces-
sary, but these are not pursued here (Breslin 2008; Mittelman 1996). Data on the following 
regional powers is included in this paper, but only the first four are discussed: Brazil, China, 
India, South Africa, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Mexico and Nigeria. They are situated in the fol-
lowing regions: Asia and the Pacific, Latin America and the Caribbean, the Middle East and 
North Africa, sub-Saharan Africa. 
2 The Rise and Fall of Nations 
Brazil, China, India, and South Africa have ascended to the position of important actors in 
global politics and the global economy. They are regional powers (Nolte 2010; Flemes 2010b; 
Nabers 2010a, 2010b; Hurrell 2007). China and India, the “Asian Drivers of Global Change,” 
have a considerable influence on the global economy and global politics (Hsieh and Klenow 
2009; Kaplinsky and Messner 2008). Due to its high level of growth, its foreign and foreign 
economic policy, and its integration politics in Latin America, Brazil is gaining increasing in-
fluence (Flemes 2010a; Valladão 2006). South Africa—a much smaller nation—is important in 
Southern Africa in terms of the formation of the security architecture, the integration of the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC), and the monetary integration in the 
Southern African Customs Union (SACU). Brazil, China, and India participate in the devel-
opment of technical and economic norms and standards, in international security, in mis-
sions in conflict regions, in climate and energy politics, and in issues related to currency and 
the global economy. They also have an increasing influence within international organiza-
tions (WTO, WHO, UN). 
The political science discourse is most advanced in terms of the conception of regional 
powers, the variety of approaches, and the methods; the economic criteria have not, however, 
been adequately explained.2 The extent to which economic power is a necessary condition for 
holding the role of regional power remains unclear in the academic discussion. Which fac-
tors, then, enable a state to become a regional power, also in economic terms? In order to ad-
dress the research gaps in this area, this paper deals with the following conceptual questions: 
                                                     
2 Nolte’s political science approach identifies the fundamental criteria; Nolte also identifies the indicator “share of 
regional GDP,” but says it is an inadequate indicator for the definition of regional power (Nolte 2006, 2010). On 
the importance of geopolitics, see Karoline Postel-Vinay (2001, 2007). Many realists, such as Mearsheimer (2001), 
evaluate power primarily in terms of military power (offensive realism). This is supplemented by including GDP 
(economic power and population). Other authors choose economic power, human capital, and technological 
level as economic indicators. Ikenberry, Mustanduno and Wohlfort (2009) also draw upon economic and techno-
logical criteria as central (high-tech production, R&D expenditures, distribution of Internet servers); Nabers 
(2010a) describes leadership as “discursive hegemony.” See Nabers 2010a, 2010b; Nolte 2010; Flemes and Lemke 
2010; Hurrell 2007, 2010. Prys adds to the discussion using the term “regional hegemony,” Prys 2008. 
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a) What relevance do the economies of regional powers have for these powers’ global po-
litical ascent and regional influence? That is, what characterizes the economics of regional 
powers? There are only a few economics studies on this topic. K.W. Rothschild (1971: 7) 
writes, “Yet if we look at the main run of economic theory over the past hundred years 
we find that it is characterized by a strange lack of power considerations.” 
b) Because economic power is relational, the relationship of regional powers to other na-
tion-states in the region should be analyzed. Are they cooperation partners? Are they 
competitors? Do they form a counterpole? Are they followers or free riders? 
c) Which economic criteria should reasonably be drawn upon in the operationalization of 
regional powers’ economics? What role do the size of the country (and thus the greater 
raw materials stockpiles in larger countries), the growth rate of the GDP or industrial 
production, technology or money, currency, and norm-setting play? Of what importance 
are “public goods”?3 
d) How can the concept of regional powers in a networked world be conceptualized? I un-
derstand a networked world not only as one where the interchange between businesses 
and nations becomes stronger (for example, due to sinking transport costs and due to in-
tegration through cross-border direct investment), but also as one where transnational 
networks of various actors interact and develop mutual dependencies, and through their 
actions create norms and standards. Regional powers are also integrated into this net-
worked world. States’ room to maneuver is limited due to international organizations 
and global governance, but at the same time states also influence both of these. This inter-
connectedness raises the conceptual question of how the denationalization that has re-
sulted from globalization and transnationalization can be reconciled with the simultane-
ous increase in the economic and political importance of regional powers (Jakobeit, Kap-
pel, Mückenberger 2010; Subacchi 2008). 
In sum, the core questions of this paper is: What contribution can the economics of regional 
powers make to regional powers theory. 
In the following discussion, this paper will consider the discourse on the economics of 
regional powers and, starting from here, will conceptually investigate the above questions in 
order to enhance and ultimately empirically test the concept of regional powers. In this con-
tribution I do not refer to the concepts of the BRIC nations (Brazil, Russia, India, China), “ris-
ing powers,” or “emerging powers” (Wilson and Purushothaman 2003; Nolte 2006; Sgard 
2008; Gaulier, Lemoine and Ünal 2009). All those studies which do so already address the 
shifting of economic and political power relations. In Section 3 I provide an overview of the 
economic discourses on the role of regional powers’ influence on countries in the region. In 
                                                     
3 Perkins and Syrquin (1988) identify population size as a sine qua non for the power status of a great power 
which realizes endogenous growth (physical capital, human capital and technology). Lemke (2010: 34) hy-
pothesizes that the greater the share of capabilities held by a regional power, the more likely it is that the nation 
is a privileged actor (military power and economic power). See “power transition theory,” Tammen et al. 2000.  
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Section 4 I develop a proposal for a concept regarding the economics of regional powers. 
This discussion is based on the review and evaluation of data, and this section summarizes 
the empirical results. The concluding Section 5 presents the findings on the economics of re-
gional powers and their contribution to the existing discourse on regional powers. 
3 Economic Discourse Regarding the Role of Regional Powers’ Influence on Countries in 
the Region 
As early as the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries there were economic works on the 
dominance of developed nation-states, which shaped the development of less developed 
states, such as Friedrich List’s theory on British supremacy in Europe and in the world (List 
1959). Leadership in the economic process of modern capitalism has also been analyzed by 
Alois Schumpeter. He focuses on technological revolutions and their diffusion. Entrepreneurs 
bring together a bundle of incremental and fundamental innovations, implement new combi-
nations and trigger a §creative destruction” that generates growth. Innovation encompasses 
the following: (1) the creation of a new good or new quality of good, (2) the creation of a new 
method of production, (3) the opening of a new market, (4) the capture of a new source of 
supply, and (5) a new organization of industry (for example, the creation or destruction of a 
monopoly). Countries with the will to win dominate over those without an innovative dy-
namic. As a result of the disruptions, transitions from “the respective centre of gravity to an-
other” occur (Schumpeter 1987: 99). Due to this outcompeting of the old powers, new combi-
nations of production factors, which require financing with loans, prevail; authority or credit, 
according to Schumpeter’s assessment, are the means, together with the will to win and the 
joy of creating, through which “leadership” comes into being (Schumpeter 1987: 127 and 138). 
Major Blocks and Satellites 
François Perroux’s (1991/1950a, 1950b) economic model takes a very different approach. Perroux 
works from the premise that the determination of the international division of labor is always a 
question of the imbalanced strength of the parties involved. Perroux draws a parallel between 
dominant firms and dominated national economies. The dominant firm achieves a surplus and 
uses this surplus to consolidate its technological and commercial superiority, thus securing in-
dependence from the capital market. The surplus company is a credit company, which, in ad-
dition to the weapons of autonomous choice of price and quantity, also has at its disposal the 
powerful weapon of loan facilities. The dominant company is also in a position to cause a reac-
tion on the part of the dominated firm: it develops the attraction and repulsion process. 
According to Perroux, the difference between firms and national economies lies in the 
fact that the nation is made up of the combined effects of state and company: consumer deci-
sions. Thus, the resulting supremacy effect cannot simply be transferred to the nation. Ac-
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cording to Perroux, when a national economy owns relatively powerful oligopolies necessary 
for strategically important goods and services, and when the bargaining power of a country 
is strengthened through the government, domination between nations unfolds to the full. 
The decisions of the “monopolies of public power,” that is, state decisions, have a lot to do 
with the ensuing supremacy. Dependence per se in foreign trade may not be the result, but 
the supremacy effect will be the rule and not the exception. In his analysis, Perroux intro-
duces the following criteria for the determination of bargaining power: the influence of the 
prevailing monopolistic power over important product groups and complementary goods 
(for example, control of the supply of a significant good such as oil, computer chips, strategic 
goods, financial markets); the influence of services and credit allocation in foreign countries; 
the emergence of a debtor situation in the dominated Nation B; and the coordination of a su-
premacy policy through the state. 
As a rule, relations between nation-states are not characterized by one-sided or bilateral 
monopolies, but rather by oligopolies or competition, such that Perroux solely develops the 
tendency to supremacy. Perroux does not equate the supremacy of country A with independ-
ence and the domination of Nation B with dependence. Nation B can resort to countermea-
sures. Major blocks (A and B), which are the dominant economies, compete simultaneously 
with each other and with the satellites (C and D) (see Figure 1). The effect is practiced exten-
sively through foreign direct investment and through the volume of goods imported by the 
dominant economy. Instabilities in expansion and contraction can be eliminated by a “buffer 
policy” (currency and financial policy, adaptation of foreign investment to export surplus). 
Figure 1: Major Blocks and Satellites 
 
Source: Author’s compilation. 
Core, Margins, and Peripheries 
The concept of a central world economy, as put forward by the German economist Andreas 
Predöhl (1971), differs from Perroux’s accumulative dynamism with its theory of the emer-
gence and expansion of the supremacy of the dominant powers. Predöhl empirically estab-
lishes a differentiation of the economy into core regions, “margin zones,” and peripheries. 
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According to Predöhl (1971), industrial core regions are the gravitational centers of the world 
economy. Their strength ensues from particularly convenient conditions, for example, the 
existence of important resources such as raw materials and population. Resident companies 
are thus able to interact with suppliers. Industrial complexes may emerge: margin zones and 
peripheries lie within the sphere of influence of corresponding core regions. Core regions are 
characterized by a large population and high industrial density, with simultaneously occur-
ring, intensive interindustrial interdependence and a high per capita income. Spatial forces 
result from the core industries of iron and steel production. Owing to high transport costs, 
core regions are clearly cut off from each other. Technological development—particularly in 
the transport and energy sectors—as well as the increasing importance of oil and electricity 
supports the stronger concentration of industries within the centers. Margin zones are charac-
terized, above all, by labor-intensive industries. An essential aspect of Predöhl’s analysis is 
the classification of a dynamism characterized by the expansion of existing trade and gravita-
tional centers. Hierarchies and asymmetries emerge. Centers within the margin can develop 
within their dependence and finally become dominant powers themselves. 
Gunnar Myrdal and Albert O. Hirschman argue similarly. According to Myrdal’s concept of 
“cumulative causation,” the relationships between center and periphery are strengthened 
through the globalization process (Myrdal 1955). The developed regions develop further 
through, among other things, innovative processes and research promotion; others come un-
der incessant pressure, become dependent, and are pulled into the vortex of the developed 
regions’ hegemony. Myrdal (ibid.) assumes that under the condition of laissez-faire there is a 
tendency towards polarization and imbalances on the world market. Hirschman’s “induced 
investments” model gives rise to trickle-down effects (Hirschman 1958) on the one hand and 
polarization effects, which come into existence particularly through the inefficient industries 
in the periphery and the efficient industries in the center, on the other. Polarization also re-
sults from the migration of well-educated and mobile people from the periphery to the cen-
ter. In Hirschman’s linkage concept, economies of scale are of central importance. This ap-
proach can be applied to relationships between a large, dominant economy and smaller 
economies. Linkages between the economies of regional powers and the countries of the re-
gions can bring about balanced or imbalanced relationships. If the ties to local markets, 
banks, traders, and research facilities remain marginal, a cycle of imbalance results—that is, 
dominance on the part of the stronger economy ensues. Through its observation of the link-
age mechanisms between the economy of the regional power and those of its regional 
neighbors, Hirschman’s concept is suited to identifying how the two entities are connected. 
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Stabilizers and Public Goods 
In his descriptive analyses Charles Kindleberger connects first and foremost ”power and 
money/finances” and “public goods.” Leaders attempt to exercise dominance by making 
public goods available, using them to secure stability. “International public goods are pro-
duced, if at all, by the leading power, a so-called ‘hegemon’” (Kindleberger 1987: 13). The 
hegemon is prepared to take on the costs of the public goods. Other countries profit from the 
leading power’s initiative, for example, from reliable systems of rules. As a result of the ap-
plication of standards implemented by the hegemonic state, transaction costs sink, and the 
sanctioning power of the hegemon makes conflicts less likely. 
The hegemon is, simultaneously, a “stabilizer.” The stabilizer is able “to provide a market 
for distress goods, a steady if not countercyclical flow of capital, and a rediscount mecha-
nism for providing liquidity when the monetary system is frozen in panic” (Kindleberger 
1981: 247). In addition, the stabilizer must steer the structure of the currency rates and ad-
ministrate the coordination of domestic monetary policy. All the other states accept this be-
cause they participate and receive benefits. According to Kindleberger, small countries have 
no economic power and they also have no responsibility for the overall system. But when 
these small countries ally in “conscious parallel action” (Kindleberger 1981: 249), they can 
have an influence. 
The danger always exists that leadership will be transformed into exploitation; that is, that 
the public goods provided are used one-sidedly to the benefit of the leading power. Exploita-
tion occurs when the hegemon applies power. Kindleberger understands power as strength, 
but this strength must be applied effectively. Size alone (of a country or of a company) is not 
adequate; also necessary are “intelligence, readiness to respond, and efficiency in translating 
decisions into action” (Kindleberger 1970: 56). Based on this, Kindleberger defines power as 
follows: “Power is the strength plus the capacity to use it effectively” (Kindleberger 1970: 65). 
According to Kindleberger, the exercise of power includes a nation’s display of economic 
productivity and mobility. The advantage for the leadership is being the first to enjoy the 
fruits of research, which in turn gives the leader the capacity to transform. Kindleberger’s 
contribution on regional power is therefore characterized by the terms public goods and capac-
ity to transform, with which the relational dynamics of these interconnections are highlighted. 
Susan Strange (1975) bases her structural power concept on the heterodox perspective of 
international political economy. She assumes the power of states and the role of transnation-
ally active nongovernmental organizations. According to her concept, economic power is ex-
ercised on four levels (Strange 1975: 222): (1) Rich countries and their governments influence 
the structure of the global economy through the pattern of their investments, production, 
trade, and consumption. (2) They establish the framework for minimum standards for the 
maintenance of stability, order, and law in the global market economy. (3) National govern-
ments exercise economic power through the formulation of national laws (for factors of pro-
duction, credit, and markets). The government with the biggest domestic market and the 
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largest number of multinational businesses (that are important in driving global production) 
possesses the greatest economic power. (4) Buyers and sellers, creditors, and debtors affect 
economic transactions at the operational level. Economic power is thus always the result of a 
bargaining process; that is, it is relational. 
Technology and Hegemony 
According to Richard R. Nelson and Gavin Wright (1992), emerging nations can initiate a catch-
ing-up process and thereby ascend to the position of technologically leading nations. This 
depends above all on them (a) raising the total factor productivities,4 (b) increasing the in-
vestment and savings rates, and (c) identifying new organizational forms in industry and the 
“political economies.” What is meant by this is that today’s global society is a network soci-
ety and that research can be imitated anywhere, which means that technology can become a 
“public good.” Rising nations, such as regional powers, can use investments in education 
and in research and development (R&D) to more easily adapt developed countries’ technol-
ogy and thereby advance (Fan 2008; Altenburg, Schmitz and Stamm 2008; Nayyar 2008; 
Frietsch and Schüller 2010). Thus, according to Nelson and Wright, what regional powers 
need to develop their power status, aside from a mass-production market, is first and fore-
most technological leadership. 
Recent studies from Ricardo Hausmann and Dani Rodrik (2003) support this view. The au-
thors compare the technology-adaptation process of companies in developing countries di-
rectly with the innovation process in industrialized countries. They model technological ad-
aptation as a business process that involves similar risks and costs to the innovation process. 
Accordingly, regional powers do not simply dominate their neighbor countries: through local 
technological efforts the neighboring countries in the region can increase their own produc-
tivity and develop technologically, meaning that they have something to use as leverage 
against the regional powers (Keller 2004). 
Power Imbalances and Asymmetries 
Regional powers influence neighboring states in various ways. They can make their influence 
felt through (a) the granting of development aid to alter the political balance in other coun-
tries, (b) the strategic granting of contracts to foreign companies, or (c) the exercise of pres-
sure on international organizations so that “friendly governments” can receive “good deals.” 
Pol Antràs and Padró i Miquel (2009) have developed a model which is concerned first and 
foremost with the influence of foreign interests that aim to impact the political process in an-
                                                     
4 Total factor productivity is a variable which accounts for capital input, labour input, and technology. Techno-
logical growth and efficiency are the main components of total factor productivity. Total factor productivity 
can be seen as the driver of growth within an economy. 
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other country. A fundamental category within this approach is that of external economies. If 
countries are balanced in their relationship (not too great a difference in factor endowments), 
the reciprocal influence can lead to a strong Pareto optimum and boost the overall welfare of 
both countries by increasing efficiency. Antràs and Padró i Miquel demonstrate that in cer-
tain circumstances free trade can both increase as well as decrease welfare. The model also 
shows that the interaction of the economic power of two countries can alter trade agree-
ments. In this respect, the authors discover that weak countries, which have already been 
made to accept the influence of the stronger power, can no longer move the strong country to 
undertake concerted action towards an agreement on the improvement of global welfare. 
The strong nation gains nothing and remains inactive (Antràs and Padró i Miquel 2009: 24). 
For our inquiry it can thus be concluded that foreign influence, for example by a regional 
power, leads to a backlash if the imbalances are already too great. If, on the other hand, the 
countries are not too unequal, regional powers can, using contracts and exchange, definitely 
effect welfare gains for both sides. 
Power in Value Chains 
The progression of globalization, the advances in information and communications technolo-
gies, and the concurrent reduction of transfer costs have promoted international vertical coop-
eration in global value chains. The majority of types of vertical cooperation are characterized 
by an asymmetrical relationship between a lead firm and its suppliers. Global value chains, as 
defined by Gary Gereffi (1994, 1999), focus predominantly on the description and analysis of the 
current situation of value chains with regard to governance and input–output structure. Gereffi 
makes a distinction between two types of hierarchical chains (based on their governance struc-
ture): buyer-driven value chains and producer-driven value chains. Buyer-driven value chains are la-
bor-intensive production chains in which the producers hold a subordinate position to the lead 
firms. The lead firms are, in most cases, global trade or marketing chains and brand producers. 
In producer-driven value chains multinationals (lead firms) play the dominant role. Here, domi-
nance is a matter of capital- and technology-intensive production, for example, the manufac-
turing of cars, planes, and computers. The lead firms themselves handle the largest part of the 
capital-intensive production. Subordinate firms manufacture more labor-intensive parts. The 
lead firms of the chains usually belong to global oligopolies. 
The value chain approaches make clear that the exercise of power in the chain is rela-
tional and that various actors shape its governance—as a cooperative process; as dominance; 
or even as exploitation, that is, through asymmetrical benefits. Those countries with many 
lead firms in value chains and with strong lead firms in value chains are able to exert influ-
ence on the enterprises of the region because they shape norms and standards (Raikes, Friis 
Jensen and Ponte 2000; Raff and Schmitt 2009). 
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The Multipolar World and Transnational Networks 
Networks are exercising increasing influence. As a result of international regimes, suprana-
tional institutions, and transnational networks (TNNs), the nation-state’s power is limited 
(see Fig. 2). Even regional powers are integrated in TNNs and supranational organizations, 
which can in turn also restrict power. In recent decades the state has become increasingly 
“destateified.” The public spending to GDP ratio has decreased; public enterprises have been 
privatized; and the state interferes notably less often in the regulation of the market. The 
state is also becoming increasingly “denationalized.” The nation-state has ceded numerous 
functions to supranational organizations, as in the case of the jointly agreed-upon rules 
within the framework of the WTO. The weakened nation-state is also the result of the new 
dynamic of globalization, within which the nation-state is just one of many actors due to 
transnational linkages (Risse 2004; Jakobeit, Kappel, Mückenberger 2010; Subacchi 2008). 
Figure 2: States, Transnational Actors and Supranational Bodies 
 
Source: Author’s compilation. 
Businesses and trade associations manage their activities together. They finalize contracts, 
establish norms, and agree upon long-term delivery relationships. In the event of conflicts, 
the businesses themselves mediate. Businesses; lobby groups; international “advocacy net-
works” (Keck and Sikkink 1998); human rights, environmental and consumer groups; and 
consulting firms engage interactively in the norm-creation process of value chains. The state 
often participates only peripherally in such negotiation processes. 
The standardization of technical norms; the worldwide establishment of labor, environ-
mental, and human rights standards; the codes of conduct for businesses, such as corporate 
social responsibility (CSR); and the expansion of public–private partnerships demonstrate 
transnational networks’ increasing political influence. The question that results is how we 
can connect the concept of regional powers with a concept that incorporates globalization 
Kappel: On the Economics of Regional Powers 15 
and transnationalization. These fundamental and rapid processes have led to a shift in eco-
nomic power relations and structures (Kappel 1996; Kappel and Brach 2009; Bartley 2007; 
Jakobeit, Kappel, Mückenberger 2010). A country that demonstrates a greater networking 
capacity may thus have better chances of developing into a regional power. As numerous 
studies have found, the power of states is no longer dependent only on economic and mili-
tary power; it is also determined by a state’s capacity to network with other states (Slaughter 
2009). The state itself is becoming a “networking agent.” 
4 Empirics, Categorization, and Systematization of Regional Powers 
A review of the literature shows that there are numerous approaches to describing power and 
leadership in economics. On the basis of these theoretical approaches, and the above ques-
tions, I develop criteria regarding the “economics of regional powers.” Starting from the vari-
ous discourses on power, I bring together some of the strands of the discussion. The purpose 
is to determine how regional powers exercise economic power/governance in their region. 
I consider the following aspects to be particularly viable for a modeling theory and em-
pirical investigation: 
1. Economic Dynamic. The regional power is characterized by the size of its market (popula-
tion, GDP) and its technological dynamism. It is a relatively strong industrial power, and 
its growth is shaped by technology, innovation, R&D and dynamic entrepreneurship. 
Above all else, it is the new technology that becomes a power resource. A high level of 
industrial growth draws investment from around the world as well as labor and supply 
industries (from the models of Perroux, Predöhl, and Krugman) and radiates via vertical 
integration into the region. The thesis is as follows: due to their economic dynamism, re-
gional powers are attractive to foreign direct investment. Through technological ad-
vances, the rapidly growing regional power gains competitive advantages over countries 
that are growing more slowly. 
2. Geography. The regional power’s close proximity to the region (relatively low transport 
costs, historical connections) favors trade and direct investment. The thesis is that the re-
gional power influences trade more strongly than the other countries in the region and ad-
vances regional integration overall due to its own growth. Positive relations with neighbors 
lead to cooperation, increases in growth, and technological spillover (Collier 2007: 53).5 
However, cut-throat competition most likely arises. The regional power can utilize trade 
openness better than others (from the models of Krugman and Antràs/Miquel). 
3. Vertical Networks. In the global economy, global value chains are playing an increasingly 
important role. These are mostly dominated by key players from the OECD world, but 
leading businesses from regional powers often also take on a dominant role in hierarchi-
                                                     
5 Collier emphasizes the negative effects of “bad neighbours.” 
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cal and quasi-hierarchical value chains. Within the value chains, the key players steer the 
businesses that are participating in the chain. The thesis is that technologically leading 
businesses from the regional powers strongly codetermine the governance in these chains 
and, through subcontracting and the vertical integration of businesses from the countries 
of the region, have a steering function in the value chain with respect to technology, tech-
nology transfer, distribution of rents, and barriers of entry (Brach and Kappel 2009; Kap-
pel and Brach 2009; Schmitz 2004). Leadership in the global value chain is an important 
basis for the economic position of regional powers in the region; this leadership has to do 
with the technological leadership of innovative businesses in the region (from the models 
of Schumpeter and Sturgeon/Gereffi). 
4. Regional Integration. Regional powers take on a key role in regional organizations—a free 
trade zone or a monetary union—for example, in the design of the governance. The re-
gional power shapes the regional governance through its norm-setting contribution: the 
development of customs duties and nontariff trade barriers. Monetary cooperation is es-
pecially difficult because states only unwillingly relinquish their monetary autonomy. 
Many nation-states in the region (particularly the smaller ones) thus face a tricky choice: 
the autonomy of the currency, an informal alliance, or formal subordination to the strong 
currency of the regional power (or pegging with the United States dollar). In an agreed-
upon monetary partnership, a regional power can only dominate the joint currency pol-
icy when the cooperation is reciprocal and the smaller country gains benefits through the 
partnership, for instance, in the form of a stable currency and compensation funds. How-
ever, at the same time the “master currency” must be imposed; without “enforcement” 
and sanctions—for example, in the form of threatened exclusion—the monetary coopera-
tion would collapse. The regional power ensures the stability of the currency and the ex-
istence of compensation mechanisms. Only when the regional power is prepared to offer 
an anchor of stability can it secure the steadiness of the currency and financial policy in 
the region, be accepted by the cooperating countries, and thus possess leadership (from 
Kindleberger’s model). 
5. Relational Power applies to all the fields considered; that is, the regional power acts in an 
environment marked by competition and cooperation. Relational power means that re-
gional powers participate in significant decisions, for example, within the regional or-
ganizations, and have the greatest influence on economic and monetary integration—
despite other actors such as the large OECD countries and other countries in the region. 
The thesis is that regional powers possess decision-making power not only due to their 
economic power but also due to their networking capacity vis-à-vis their cooperation 
partners (from the model of Sturgeon/Gereffi 2009). 
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Results of Descriptive Statistics 
Based on our theoretical observations and the five most important economic aspects (eco-
nomic dynamic, geography, vertical networks, regional integration, and relational power) we 
have tested for country size, population, per capita income, growth of GDP, foreign trade, in-
dustrialization, direct investment, research and development expenditure, public goods, and 
institutions. The criteria for our descriptive statistics and for our regression sample are as fol-
lows: the country is located in Asia and the Pacific, Latin America, the Middle East and North 
Africa, or sub-Saharan Africa; the country has at least 15 million inhabitants; the regional 
power is located on one of the above-mentioned continents. This leaves 38 countries that fit 
the base specification. Some of the significant findings of the descriptive statistics are illus-
trated in the following nine observations. 
Observation 1: 
Regional powers have a very large land area and a large population in comparison to their 
region (see Fig. 3). India and China are the most heavily populated countries in the world. 
China’s share of the global population is approximately 20 percent; India’s is 17 percent. Bra-
zil and South Africa are smaller in terms of population and area; however, they are relatively 
large in their respective regions. 
Figure 3: Share of Regional Population, in %, in 2000 
 
Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank). 
Observation 2: 
Some regional powers have a higher average per capita income than the regional average. The 
per capita incomes in India and China, however, are below the regional average, whereas 
South Africa’s is significantly higher (see Fig. 4). The average growth in income per capita in 
the regional powers was greater than that in the respective regions in the period 1990–2008, 
even though some smaller countries in the regions were able to achieve much greater growth 
(for example, Taiwan, Singapore, and Botswana). India’s average growth in per capita income 
for the period 1990–2008 was even lower than that of its neighboring countries (see Fig. 5). 
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Figure 4: Real GDP Per Capita in 2000 
 
Source: Penn World Table (University of Pennsylvania). 
Figure 5: Growth Rate of Per Capita Income, in %, 1990–2008 
 
Source: Author’s compilation, based on World Development Indicators 2010 (World Bank). 
Observation 3: 
With the exception of Brazil and South Africa, regional powers have achieved a higher aver-
age growth in GDP (1980–2000) and contribute significantly to global and regional growth 
(see Fig. 6). Only China and, to a lesser degree, India are of importance for the global eco-
nomic situation; Brazil and South Africa, in contrast, are much less important. Both Brazil’s 
and South Africa’s average growth during the last 25 years amounted to only 2 percent; that 
is, due to their more limited economic dynamic they are not “motors of growth,” either glob-
ally or regionally, as is often assumed. One can say of Brazil, India, and China that they have 
achieved the status of “global economic power,” even though they continue to be viewed as 
developing or middle-income countries on the basis of their per capita income. That is to say 
that before becoming wealthy they had achieved a very large share of the world GDP (meas-
ured in purchasing power parity, 2006) due to their size and economic strength: 15 percent 
for China and 6.4 percent for India (Rodrik 2006; Lemoine and Ünal-Kesenci 2007: 11). 
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Figure 6: Average Annual Growth of GDP, in %, 1980–2000 
 
Source: Penn World Table (University of Pennsylvania). 
Observation 4: 
The regional powers account for a significant proportion of foreign trade; however, Brazil’s 
and South Africa’s shares have declined. The comparative data show a lower anchoring in 
the region’s trade for Brazil and South Africa at present (see Annex 1). The foreign-trade ori-
entation (trade/GDP ratio) is low(er) and doesn’t represent the size of the respective country. 
There are, however, major differences between the countries. India, for example, is very 
weakly integrated in the global economy and the region, but is catching up based on the high 
export growth rate (Qureshi and Wan 2008; Feigenbaum 2010; Betz 2010) and has positioned 
itself to focus on medium- and high-range export products (approximately 47 percent in 
2007; Gaulier et al. 2010: 2). Brazil and South Africa still export mineral products and natural 
resource–based manufactured goods. China, in contrast, is today the most important global 
exporter of finished products, which are largely produced by foreign firms located in China 
(Lemoine 2010; Lemoine and Ünal-Kesenci 2007; Qureshi and Wan 2008; Kaplinsky and 
Messner 2008). China’s exports show a technological level that is comparable to that of Por-
tugal, which has an income per capita (PPP) that is three times higher, but China’s exports 
remain heavily concentrated on low-tech-products (approximately 65 percent in 2007; Bensi-
dou, Lemoine and Ünal 2009, see Fig. 7 on growth of exports from regional powers 1980–
2000). China has a growing influence on intraregional trade in Asia and is creating new re-
gional growth, whereas India is lagging far behind in terms of its integration in intraregional 
trade (Lemoine and Ünal-Kesenci 2007; Chaturvedy and Malone 2009). 
The consideration of integration in value chains could be of relevance. This could show 
how strongly the linkages between businesses from the regional powers—also in comparison 
to businesses from the EU and the USA—and businesses from the region have developed. 
Also important in this respect is the kind of businesses. For instance, energy security and 
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strategic trading considerations play a large role in China’s foreign trade strategy. To date, 
however, there has been a shortage of empirically rich studies on integration in value chains. 
Examples indicate that businesses from the regional powers apparently play a much greater 
role sectorally than foreign trade and investment statistics would lead us to believe.6 In the 
SADC, South African businesses dominate the regional value chains, through, among other 
things, buyer-driven chains (South African department stores) or producer-driven chains 
(breweries, textile production) (Alden and Soko 2005; Shaw, Cooper and Chin 2009). The 
same is assumed of Chinese businesses, but less so of Indian businesses. 
Figure 7: Export Growth, in %, 1980–2000 
 
Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank). 
Observation 5: 
Regional powers have a more differentiated economic structure than other countries in the 
region. The value added of the respective processing industries is higher than in the region 
(see Fig. 8). Due to this technologically determined development, which is based on large 
markets with economies of scale, the regional power can exercise leadership. However, lead-
ership is not identical to hegemony, let alone exploitation; rather, it can benefit development 
in the region. Under which conditions this occurs, however, cannot be determined using the 
data reviewed in this contribution. We can assume, though, that technological frontrunners 
generate transformation processes (diffusion of technology, advances in productivity), so that 
wealth spreads. If a regional power grows industrially, its appeal grows. When the countries 
in a region are predominantly agrarian and the differences between the regional power and 
the agrarian-oriented region are too great, industrial alignment is hindered, as in the case of 
South Africa in southern Africa or China in Southeast Asia. 
                                                     
6 Sturgeon and Gereffi (2009) make clear that there are serious data gaps in the analysis of value chains. 
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Figure 8: Industry, Value Added and Growth, in %, 1980–2000 
 
Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank). 
In many cases backlash—for example, protectionism—arises because the power imbalances 
are too great. This doesn’t apply, however, to neighbor countries that are smaller but capable 
of competing industrially—for instance, Japan, Singapore, Taiwan and Korea in Asia. The 
regional power’s industrial strength is thus relational and does not lead to leadership or, 
much less so, dominance. Industrially growing regional powers7 are in any case attractive to 
investors from other countries. Foreign direct investment from OECD countries in the indus-
trial and tertiary sectors has increased significantly in recent years in all four regional powers 
investigated here. Together the former’s share of the foreign direct investment flows to all 
developing countries is now almost 25 percent, with China attracting the largest proportion 
of this (Nayyar 2008). This means the regional powers are thereby speeding up their catch-
ing-up process, without completely diverting foreign direct investment away from the coun-
tries in the region. Foreign direct investment is increasing in these countries too, for example, 
in Vietnam (Kubny, Mölders and Nunnenkamp 2008). 
Regional powers themselves are also increasingly emerging as investors in the region. 
South Africa is taking on an important role in this respect, and is often the most important 
investor in the region. The same is also true of Brazil, whereas India’s investment in the re-
gion is relatively low. China’s share of investment in ASEAN is 0.3 percent; Brazil’s share in 
MERCOSUR is 7.9 percent; South Africa’s in the SADC is approximately 25 percent; and In-
dia’s in the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) is only 1.6 percent 
(Kubny, Mölders and Nunnenkamp 2008). 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
7 This applies equally to advancing tertiary-sector economies such as India. 
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Observation 6: 
In terms of human capital, regional powers have, on average, higher values than other coun-
tries in the region. However, the increase in the average length of secondary school education 
for the period 1980–2000 was often lower than that of the region (definitively in the case of 
Brazil). South Africa, in contrast, was far above the regional values (see Fig. 9). 
Figure 9: Growth of Secondary School Education, in %, 1980–2000 
 
Note: Increase in average schooling in years, secondary schools. 
Source: Barro Lee Dataset (Barro and Lee 2000). 
Observation 7: 
Regional powers demonstrate lower expenditures for R&D than the OECD world. For years 
they have been increasing their R&D activities and have started to catch-up. However, they 
are leaders in their region (see Fig. 10). 
Figure 10: Gross Domestic Expenditure on R&D as % of GDP, 2007 or latest year available 
 
Source: Author’s compilation, based on UNESCO Institute for Statistics, UIS 2009. 
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Observation 8: 
Regional powers influence the monetary and credit policies of their neighbor countries, as 
well as regional cooperation. They thereby exercise hegemony. Brazil, South Africa, China, 
and India are active and dominant in the development of regional cooperation in their re-
spective regions to very different degrees (Kaplinsky and Messner 2008; Fritz and Mühlich 
2010). Most clear is South Africa’s domination of monetary integration in southern Africa 
through the SACU (South African Customs Union), which has existed since 1910, and the 
Common Monetary Area in South Africa (CMA) (McCarthy 1998 and 2008; Alden and Soko 
2005). The smaller countries in the region profit from the SACU customs revenues through a 
compensatory mechanism. Within the CMA, Lesotho, Namibia, and Swaziland are fixed to 
the South African rand.8 South Africa plays a clear leadership role within the SACU and the 
CMA. Brazil has made efforts to advance monetary integration within MERCOSUR; how-
ever, this integration has not proceeded very far. To date there has been no sign of a joint cur-
rency and no monetary leadership on the part of Brazil (Fritz and Mühlich 2010). 
For many countries in its region China is an important trading partner, which stimulates 
its own exports, including those within the region, through an undervalued currency. Al-
though China maintains free trade agreements with 10 ASEAN states, something which has 
led to increasing foreign trade linkages with the region (from 4 percent in 2000 to 12 percent 
in 2009), there is no monetary integration between China and the ASEAN states and there are 
no reliable compensation mechanisms (Colavecchio and Funke 2009; Zi and Jinxia 2009; 
Rüland and Jetschke 2008). China uses the cooperation within the CAFTA (China-ASEAN 
Free Trade Area) for its own trade; the low exchange rate has also contributed to its high 
trade surplus. At the same time, China has invested more heavily in ASEAN countries. Be-
cause of the dynamics of China’s growth and the increased integration in Asia, intraregional 
trade is growing, for example, in ASEAN and also in East Asia. China’s economic influence is 
increasing because of growing Chinese investment in the region (Fritz and Mühlich 2010). 
China is simultaneously working towards the regionalization of the renminbi and has played 
a stronger role in monetary integration in East Asia since the Asian financial crisis. The ren-
minbi nevertheless remains limited as a “lead currency” (Colavecchio and Funke 2009). In-
dia’s monetary importance in the region has been low to date, something that is linked to, 
among other things, its very limited investment and trade in the region (Nel and Stephen 
2010; Betz 2010). 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
8 The South African rand is also Botswana’s anchor currency; the rand is the reference currency for Zimbabwe’s 
currency, cf. McCarthy 2008; Fritz and Mühlich 2010. 
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Observation 9: 
Regional powers do not have better institutions than the average country of the region. Their 
low productivity, weak capital accumulation, and marginal output per worker are deter-
mined by their weak social infrastructure—that is, institutions and the government—which 
influences the economic environment (Hall and Jones 1999). 
The nine observations regarding the regional powers make clear that some of the regional 
powers are particularly strong. They demonstrate economic dynamism; they have an influence 
on direct investment and monetary cooperation; and, through institutions, they also have an 
influence within the region. This dynamism promotes regional trade. From an economic per-
spective, China is without doubt both a global and a regional power. This is far less the case for 
India. Brazil is a relatively strong economic power, but it is not particularly strongly posi-
tioned, either globally or regionally, because other countries in the region—such as Argentina, 
Chile and Venezuela—also play a role. South Africa does not currently have very much global 
importance because it only has a small population and global trade does not play a crucial 
role—its share of world markets is even declining. Nevertheless, the country is the only mean-
ingful economic power in the region (and on the continent) and exercises leadership in the re-
gion with respect to investment, monetary cooperation, and institutional influence. 
Regression Results 
For the regressions9 (see data in Annex 2), we used a simple probit model (dependent vari-
able: Dummy 1 regional power /0 other country) to produce some stylized facts. The main 
advantage of the regression approach is that we can control for other variables and thus bet-
ter evaluate the importance of selected variables. Given the fact that there are only nine re-
gional powers in our sample, some variables cannot be tested within this framework due to 
the perfect-prediction problem. Another problem that we take into account is “multicollin-
earity,” as many of the variables we would like to test are highly correlated with the basic 
variables. These basic variables have been chosen according to traditions in economic cross-
country modeling and data availability (to avoid already reducing the sample size in the base 
regression). Another potential problem that we do not control for is endogeneity.10 
The following results for this sample are robust: 
1. The base specification clearly shows that sheer size (measured in both total GDP and 
population size) is a fundamental feature of regional powers. However, regional “superi-
ority” is also very important, as reflected by the coefficient for the GDP per capita (meas-
ured as distance to the regional mean). 
                                                     
9 This part of the paper was prepared by Toman Omar Mahmoud. 
10 Omitted variable bias is the most common illustration of what economists refer to as endogeneity. 
Endogenous variables are variables determined by other variables in the system, while exogenous variables 
are variables which can be considered external shocks to the system. 
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2. When basic variables are controlled for, growth of GDP per capita does not seem to be a 
determinant of being a regional power. This effect is almost statistically significant. 
3. Exports of goods and services (percent of GDP): The share of exports in GDP does not 
play a role in shaping a regional power. However, compared to other countries in their 
respective regions, countries that have a higher share of exports in their GDP are more 
likely to be regional powers. 
4. Industry, value added (percent of GDP): A higher GDP share of industrial value added 
also increases a country’s chances of becoming a regional power. 
5. There is no evidence that the average number of years of secondary education among the 
population has any influence on determining whether a country is a regional power or not. 
6. Productivity does not seem to play an important role. We can even observe that countries 
that are more productive than other countries in the same region are less likely to be a 
regional power. 
The overall results of the regression analysis are mixed, especially with regard to economic 
performance. Countries that are more industrialized and more export-oriented appear more 
likely to be regional powers. It appears that some of the criteria or indicators for “how to 
measure regional powers” need to be qualified and tested empirically. 
What is the “Economic Power” of Regional Powers? 
Based on the above explanations and empirical findings, we can define, in economic terms, a 
regional power as follows: 
— The regional power is an economic power in the region which has influence and pos-
sesses the capacity for regional and global action. 
— The regional power has a relatively large population and covers a relatively large area. 
— The regional power realizes high economic growth—above the regional average—over a 
longer period of time and thus provides a growing market for the region. 
— The regional power plays a dominant role in trade within the region. 
— The regional power develops industrially and technologically; the state expenditures for 
R&D increase and come close, or overtake, the level in the OECD world. 
— The regional power has regionally and globally active businesses, which are increasing in 
strength. These provide competition for businesses from the OECD world within the re-
gional–global value chains and increasingly dominate the regional markets. 
— The regional power increasingly provides public goods in the form of a stable currency 
and reliable monetary policy. 
— The regional power takes on an increasing role in the governance of the region, particu-
larly with respect to regional cooperation agreements. 
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5 Conclusion: What Can the Economics of Regional Powers Contribute to Regional 
Powers Theory? 
The status of a regional power is always challenged as a result of the collective bargaining 
power of others, be it on the part of the EU, the USA, or the opposing powers within the re-
gion. Regional powers’ radius of action is also influenced by transnational norm-building 
networks—for instance, as a result of norms and standards created by businesses, civil soci-
ety actors and supranational organizations. There is a great need for research in this area (Ja-
kobeit, Kappel and Mückenberger 2010). 
The four regional powers observed here without doubt play a role in their regions; India, 
China, and Brazil also play a global role. They are heavyweights in their region in terms of 
trade, less so, however, in terms of their regional investment (with the exception of South Af-
rica). They are active players in regional integration, though their monetary and integrative 
leadership achievements—though increasing—have been rather weak, except in the case of 
South Africa. As a result of their strong growth, the regional powers exert significant influ-
ence in their region, which is able to somewhat compensate for the negative effects of cut-
throat competition. The extent to which development aid, investment funds, and other pub-
lic goods can compensate the disadvantaged countries for the losses suffered should be 
tested. To date, however, China, India, Brazil, and South Africa have only taken on this duty 
to a limited extent. 
China is a global actor and is, economically speaking, very strongly networked interna-
tionally. Its regional influence is increasing but is still low because the integration through 
trade and direct investment is not very intensive. China’s regional leadership achievements 
are rather limited. India, on the other hand, is not a significant regional player (it is rather a 
“detached power” (Prys 2010) and a latecomer), as its low foreign trade integration and its 
very low investment in the region demonstrate. India is poor and has a very poorly devel-
oped infrastructure (roads, harbors, airports, electricity), and only a few sectors are competi-
tive. Nevertheless, it is of importance because it is large and has a high rate of economic 
growth. Brazil is without doubt a significant economic power in Latin America, as shown by 
its trade, direct investment, and technological development. South Africa is globally insig-
nificant but the leading power in its region. Its weak global role is a result of its limited eco-
nomic power and, above all, the frailness of its economically weak neighbor countries. 
I have focused in this contribution on the above-mentioned areas of observation. Thus 
only limited statements on the economics of regional powers are possible. The regressions 
show that the size of the country (population) and the per capita income are decisive. Other 
aspects, for example, the growth in per capita income, apparently do not play a particular 
role. The share of the GDP accounted for by the respective regional power’s trade appears 
not to be significant; its growth dynamic, in contrast, is significant. Our analysis also shows 
that education level, productivities, the investment quota, population growth, migration, and 
the quality of institutions in regional powers appear not to be better than those in the other 
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countries of the respective regions. Further analyses of the regional value chains, the devel-
opment aid provided, and credit allocation (indebtedness) are necessary. 
What do the findings on the economics of regional powers presented here contribute to 
the existing discourse on regional powers? (1) The economics of regional powers are of out-
standing importance for the status of the regional power in the region. (2) Because the re-
gional powers are primarily entering higher-value growth markets, they are contributing to 
creative destruction in the region, thereby deepening their economic influence. (3) Being a re-
gional power also means making advances in research, which in turn enhances the regional 
power’s appeal. (4) If the regional powers (can) increasingly provide public goods, they gain 
increasing influence. 
This contribution has served to identify those economic aspects that could be of relevance 
in the further weighting of leadership in the region. The discussion on regional powers there-
fore necessitates more research on the economic conditions and the development of regional-
power status, beyond the political, military, and discursive factors which have primarily been 
considered to date. 
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Annex 1: Regional Powers’ Trade with Other Country Groups, in % 
Brazil Exports Imports 
Year 2009 1995 2009 1995 
Total region 17.3 20.5 14.9 18.4 
EU 22.2 27.8 22.9 27.7 
China 13.2 18.7 15.7 21.1 
US 10.2 2.6 12.5 2.1 
India  2.2  0.7 1.7 0.7 
South Africa  0.8 0.6 0.3 0.3 
Total exports 100 100 100 100 
 
 
China Exports Imports 
Year 2007 1995 2007 1995 
Total region 12.0 8.7 18.2 12.1 
EU 20.1 12.8 11.6 16.1 
US 19.1 16.6 7.3 12.2 
India 2.0 0.5 1.5 0.3 
Brazil 0.9 0.5 1.9 0.9 
South Africa 0.6 0.4 0.7 0.5 
Total exports 100 100 100 100 
 
 
South Africa Exports Imports 
Year 2009 1995 2009 1995 
SADC (members in 2009) 6.4 10.5 2.0 2.2 
EU 13.5 24.3 16.7 45.4 
China 5.4 0.9 7.2 1.9 
US 4.7 7.5 4.2 12.0 
India 2.0 0.7 1.6 0.7 
Brazil 0.3 1.0 1.1 0.9 
Total exports 100 100 100 100 
 
 
India Exports Imports 
Year 2008–09 1996–97 2008–09 1996–97 
Total region 9.4 7.0 11.5 2.9 
EU 21.3 26.5 14.1 27.2 
China 5.0 1.8 10.7 1.9 
US 11.4 19.6 6.1 9.2 
South Africa 1.1 0.9 1.8 0.8 
Brazil 1.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 
Total exports 100 100 100 100 
Note: The data for India refer to the Indian fiscal year: 01/04/xx - 31/03/xy. 
Source: Author’s own compilation based on the Ministério do Desenvolvimento, Indústria e Comércio Exterior, 
Brazil; the Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China; the Ministry of Commerce and In-
dustry of India; and the South African Department of Trade and Industry. 
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Annex 2: Regression Results 
variable name variable label 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
gdp_tot_00 total gdp in 2000 
pop_tot_00 Population, total in 2000 
gdp_cap_dis pwt: real gross domestic product per capita, distance to regional mean in 2000 
pop_trop_ll %pop ('95) in geographical tropics level 
gdp_cap_g pwt: real gross domestic product per capita, growth 
exp_tot_g Exports of goods and services (constant 2000 US$), growth 
exp_gdp_00 Exports of goods and services (% of GDP) in 2000 
exp_gdp_dis Exports of goods and services (% of GDP), distance to regional mean in 2000 
exp_val_g Export value index (2000 = 100), growth 
ind_gdp_00 Industry, value added (% of GDP) in 2000 
ind_gdp_dis Industry, value added (% of GDP), distance to regional mean in 2000 
sec_edu_99 barro: average years of secondary education in 1999 
sec_edu_dis barro: average years of secondary education, distance to regional mean in 1999 
prod_hj_ll hall jones: productivity level 
prod_hj_dis hall jones: productivity, distance to regional mean 
inv_gdp_00 investment share of real gross domestic product per capita in 2000 
pop_gini_95 coho: geographic dispersion of the population, gini in 1995 
fert_rate_00 Fertility rate, total (births per woman) in 2000 
fert_rate_dis Fertility rate, total (births per woman), distance to regional mean in 2000 
mig_tot_00 International migration stock, total in 2000 
mig_pop_00 International migration stock (% of population) in 2000 
mig_pop_dis International migration stock (% of population), distance to regional mean in 
2000 
tour_arr_00 International tourism, number of arrivals in 2000 
tour_arr_dis International tourism, number of arrivals, distance to regional mean in 2000 
tour_arr_g International tourism, number of arrivals, growth 
peace_dis coho: length of the peace period since the end of the previous civil war, dis-
tance 
mil_labfor_00 Military personnel (% of total labor force) in 2000 
mil_labfor_dis Military expenditure (% of GDP), distance to regional mean in 2000 
voice_acc_00 voice and accountability in 2000 
voice_acc_g voice and accountability, growth 
pol_sta_00 political stability in 2000 
pol_sta_g political stability, growth 
gov_eff_00 government effectiveness in 2000 
gov_eff_g government effectiveness, growth 
reg_qual_00 regulatory quality in 2000 
reg_qual_g regulatory quality, growth 
rule_law_00 wb kaufmann: rule of law in 2000 
rule_law_g wb kaufmann: rule of law, growth 
cont_corr_00 wb kaufmann: control of corruption in 2000 
cont_corr_g wb kaufmann: control of corruption, growth 
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BASE SPECIFICATION 
.         dprobit reg_power pop_tot_00 gdp_tot_00 gdp_cap_dis pop_trop_ll if d_oecd==0 & re-
gion1!=., robus 
> t; 
Probit estimates                                        Number of obs =     87 
                                                        Wald chi2(3)  =      . 
                                                        Prob > chi2   =      . 
Log pseudo-likelihood = -7.7265743                      Pseudo R2     = 0.7330 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         |               Robust 
reg_po~r |      dF/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     x-bar  [    95% C.I.   ] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
pop_t~00 |   1.96e-09   1.75e-09     1.82   0.068   5.2e+07  -1.5e-09  5.4e-09 
gdp_t~00 |   3.81e-13   2.04e-13     2.07   0.038   2.0e+11  -1.9e-14  7.8e-13 
gdp_ca~s |   .0446243   .0333962     1.93   0.054    .91036  -.020831   .11008 
pop_tr~l |  -.0476522   .0726877    -0.63   0.530   .723337  -.190118  .094813 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  obs. P |   .1034483 
 pred. P |   .0495103  (at x-bar) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    z and P>|z| are the test of the underlying coefficient being 0 
Result: The base specification clearly shows that sheer size is a fundamental fea-
ture of regional powers. However, the regional “qualitative” superiority is 
also very important, as reflected by the coefficient for the GDP per capita. 
. *ECONOMIC DOMINANCE?; 
.         *economic growth; 
.         dprobit reg_power pop_tot_00 gdp_tot_00 gdp_cap_dis pop_trop_ll gdp_cap_g if 
d_oecd==0 & region1 
> !=., robust; 
Probit estimates                                        Number of obs =     81 
                                                        Wald chi2(4)  =      . 
                                                        Prob > chi2   =      . 
Log pseudo-likelihood = -7.2264296                      Pseudo R2     = 0.7442 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         |               Robust 
reg_po~r |      dF/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     x-bar  [    95% C.I.   ] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
pop_t~00 |   2.63e-09   2.07e-09     2.02   0.044   5.4e+07  -1.4e-09  6.7e-09 
gdp_t~00 |   5.05e-13   2.54e-13     2.39   0.017   2.1e+11   7.5e-15  1.0e-12 
gdp_ca~s |   .0491347   .0370013     1.70   0.089   .930358  -.023387  .121656 
pop_tr~l |  -.0573973   .0941607    -0.61   0.543   .727463  -.241949  .127154 
gdp_ca~g |  -2.576811   1.808133    -1.55   0.122    .03381  -6.12069  .967064 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  obs. P |   .1111111 
 pred. P |   .0621138  (at x-bar) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    z and P>|z| are the test of the underlying coefficient being 0 
Result: Controlling for basic variables, per capita growth does not seem to be a 
specialty of regional powers. 
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.         *exports of goods and services (% gdp); 
.         dprobit reg_power pop_tot_00 gdp_tot_00 gdp_cap_dis pop_trop_ll exp_gdp_00 if 
d_oecd==0 & region 
> 1!=., robust; 
Probit estimates                                        Number of obs =     82 
                                                        Wald chi2(4)  =      . 
                                                        Prob > chi2   =      . 
Log pseudo-likelihood = -7.7131797                      Pseudo R2     = 0.7281 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         |               Robust 
reg_po~r |      dF/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     x-bar  [    95% C.I.   ] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
pop_t~00 |   2.22e-09   1.90e-09     1.79   0.074   5.5e+07  -1.5e-09  6.0e-09 
gdp_t~00 |   4.27e-13   2.27e-13     2.08   0.038   2.1e+11  -1.7e-14  8.7e-13 
gdp_ca~s |   .0485891   .0354585     1.90   0.057   .929726  -.020908  .118087 
pop_tr~l |  -.0641547   .0828157    -0.75   0.455   .718689  -.226471  .098161 
exp_g~00 |   .0003287    .000924     0.36   0.721   33.6377  -.001482   .00214 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  obs. P |   .1097561 
 pred. P |    .056934  (at x-bar) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    z and P>|z| are the test of the underlying coefficient being 0 
Result: The share of exports in gdp does not play a role. 
.         *difference to regional mean of exports of goods and services (% gdp); 
.         dprobit reg_power pop_tot_00 gdp_tot_00 gdp_cap_dis pop_trop_ll exp_gdp_dis if 
d_oecd==0 & regio 
> n1!=., robust; 
Probit estimates                                        Number of obs =     82 
                                                        Wald chi2(4)  =      . 
                                                        Prob > chi2   =      . 
Log pseudo-likelihood = -6.7673282                      Pseudo R2     = 0.7615 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         |               Robust 
reg_po~r |      dF/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     x-bar  [    95% C.I.   ] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
pop_t~00 |   5.39e-10   8.58e-10     1.83   0.067   5.5e+07  -1.1e-09  2.2e-09 
gdp_t~00 |   1.38e-13   2.09e-13     2.34   0.019   2.1e+11  -2.7e-13  5.5e-13 
gdp_ca~s |    .004909   .0110117     0.96   0.335   .929726  -.016674  .026492 
pop_tr~l |  -.0494809   .0639981    -1.49   0.137   .718689  -.174915  .075953 
exp_gd~s |   .0345845   .0469334     1.80   0.072      .995  -.057403  .126572 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  obs. P |   .1097561 
 pred. P |   .0079883  (at x-bar) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    z and P>|z| are the test of the underlying coefficient being 0 
Result: Growth of exports is important. 
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.         *growth of export value index; 
.         dprobit reg_power pop_tot_00 gdp_tot_00 gdp_cap_dis pop_trop_ll exp_val_g if 
d_oecd==0 & region1 
> !=., robust; 
Probit estimates                                        Number of obs =     77 
                                                        Wald chi2(4)  =      . 
                                                        Prob > chi2   =      . 
Log pseudo-likelihood = -5.7219694                      Pseudo R2     = 0.7940 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         |               Robust 
reg_po~r |      dF/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     x-bar  [    95% C.I.   ] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
pop_t~00 |   2.22e-09   1.52e-09     1.79   0.073   5.7e+07  -7.5e-10  5.2e-09 
gdp_t~00 |   7.63e-13   5.01e-13     3.49   0.000   2.2e+11  -2.2e-13  1.7e-12 
gdp_ca~s |   .0229907   .0256651     1.04   0.298   .937375  -.027312  .073293 
pop_tr~l |  -.0535905   .0781496    -0.63   0.530   .700393  -.206761   .09958 
exp_va~g |  -2.390526   1.472224    -2.39   0.017   .038988  -5.27603  .494979 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  obs. P |   .1168831 
 pred. P |   .0483308  (at x-bar) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    z and P>|z| are the test of the underlying coefficient being 0 
Result: The value of exports index turns its sign compared to the descriptive analy-
sis! 
.         *industry, value added (% gdp) 
>         dprobit reg_power pop_tot_00 gdp_tot_00 gdp_cap_dis pop_trop_ll ind_gdp_00 if 
d_oecd==0 & region 
> 1!=., robust; 
.         *difference to regional mean of industry, value added (% gdp) 
>         dprobit reg_power pop_tot_00 gdp_tot_00 gdp_cap_dis pop_trop_ll ind_gdp_dis if 
d_oecd==0 & regio 
> n1!=., robust; 
.         *average years of secondary education; 
.         dprobit reg_power pop_tot_00 gdp_tot_00 gdp_cap_dis pop_trop_ll sec_edu_99 if 
d_oecd==0 & region 
> 1!=., robust; 
Probit estimates                                        Number of obs =     59 
                                                        Wald chi2(4)  =      . 
                                                        Prob > chi2   =      . 
Log pseudo-likelihood = -4.1462322                      Pseudo R2     = 0.8229 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         |               Robust 
reg_po~r |      dF/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     x-bar  [    95% C.I.   ] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
pop_t~00 |  -6.82e-11   1.91e-10    -0.25   0.803   6.8e+07  -4.4e-10  3.1e-10 
gdp_t~00 |   1.59e-13   3.03e-13     1.52   0.128   2.6e+11  -4.3e-13  7.5e-13 
gdp_ca~s |   .0009578   .0064022     0.21   0.837   .920129   -.01159  .013506 
pop_tr~l |     -.0419   .0771042    -1.43   0.153   .702849  -.193021  .109222 
sec_e~99 |   -.015202   .0238087    -0.61   0.544   1.30297  -.061866  .031462 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  obs. P |   .1355932 
 pred. P |   .0045801  (at x-bar) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    z and P>|z| are the test of the underlying coefficient being 0 
Result: Secondary education is not significant and negative. 
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.         *distance to regional means of average years of secondary education; 
.         dprobit reg_power pop_tot_00 gdp_tot_00 gdp_cap_dis pop_trop_ll sec_edu_dis if 
d_oecd==0 & regio 
> n1!=., robust; 
Probit estimates                                        Number of obs =     59 
                                                        Wald chi2(4)  =      . 
                                                        Prob > chi2   =      . 
Log pseudo-likelihood = -3.7414689                      Pseudo R2     = 0.8402 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         |               Robust 
reg_po~r |      dF/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     x-bar  [    95% C.I.   ] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
pop_t~00 |  -1.87e-14   1.43e-13    -0.46   0.645   6.8e+07  -3.0e-13  2.6e-13 
gdp_t~00 |   5.92e-17   5.03e-16     2.46   0.014   2.6e+11  -9.3e-16  1.0e-15 
gdp_ca~s |   4.73e-06   .0000399     1.85   0.064   .920129  -.000073  .000083 
pop_tr~l |   -.000018   .0001525    -2.20   0.028   .702849  -.000317  .000281 
sec_ed~s |  -.0000193   .0001614    -1.68   0.093   .987001  -.000336  .000297 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  obs. P |   .1355932 
 pred. P |   6.49e-07  (at x-bar) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    z and P>|z| are the test of the underlying coefficient being 0 
Result: Secondary education with respect to the regional mean is even negative. 
.         *productivity; 
.         dprobit reg_power pop_tot_00 gdp_tot_00 gdp_cap_dis pop_trop_ll prod_hj_ll if 
d_oecd==0 & region 
> 1!=., robust; 
Probit estimates                                        Number of obs =     73 
                                                        Wald chi2(4)  =      . 
                                                        Prob > chi2   =      . 
Log pseudo-likelihood = -7.2550415                      Pseudo R2     = 0.7339 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         |               Robust 
reg_po~r |      dF/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     x-bar  [    95% C.I.   ] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
pop_t~00 |   2.71e-09   2.37e-09     1.58   0.114   5.9e+07  -1.9e-09  7.3e-09 
gdp_t~00 |   7.50e-13   4.11e-13     2.32   0.020   2.2e+11  -5.5e-14  1.6e-12 
gdp_ca~s |   .0601388     .04657     1.55   0.121    .94193  -.031137  .151414 
pop_tr~l |  -.1461383   .1466296    -1.01   0.311   .763218  -.433527   .14125 
prod_h~l |  -.2810384   .3097863    -1.08   0.282      .424  -.888208  .326132 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  obs. P |   .1232877 
 pred. P |   .0894406  (at x-bar) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    z and P>|z| are the test of the underlying coefficient being 0 
Result: Productivity does not play a role. 
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.         *distance to regional mean of productivity; 
.         dprobit reg_power pop_tot_00 gdp_tot_00 gdp_cap_dis pop_trop_ll prod_hj_dis if 
d_oecd==0 & regio 
> n1!=., robust; 
Probit estimates                                        Number of obs =     73 
                                                        Wald chi2(4)  =      . 
                                                        Prob > chi2   =      . 
Log pseudo-likelihood = -6.4104691                      Pseudo R2     = 0.7648 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         |               Robust 
reg_po~r |      dF/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     x-bar  [    95% C.I.   ] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
pop_t~00 |   2.14e-09   1.88e-09     2.05   0.040   5.9e+07  -1.6e-09  5.8e-09 
gdp_t~00 |   4.34e-13   2.97e-13     2.59   0.010   2.2e+11  -1.5e-13  1.0e-12 
gdp_ca~s |   .0813752   .0643895     3.22   0.001    .94193  -.044826  .207576 
pop_tr~l |  -.0766338   .0645376    -1.06   0.287   .763218  -.203125  .049858 
prod_h~s |  -.2003314   .1610964    -2.30   0.022   .962249  -.516075  .115412 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  obs. P |   .1232877 
 pred. P |   .0360051  (at x-bar) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    z and P>|z| are the test of the underlying coefficient being 0 
Are regional powers even less productive when compared to other countries of the 
region? 
.         *investment (% gdp); 
.         dprobit reg_power pop_tot_00 gdp_tot_00 gdp_cap_dis pop_trop_ll inv_gdp_00 if 
d_oecd==0 & region 
> 1!=., robust; 
Probit estimates                                        Number of obs =     87 
                                                        Wald chi2(4)  =      . 
                                                        Prob > chi2   =      . 
Log pseudo-likelihood = -4.2396443                      Pseudo R2     = 0.8535 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         |               Robust 
reg_po~r |      dF/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     x-bar  [    95% C.I.   ] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
pop_t~00 |   1.29e-22   3.39e-21     1.50   0.133   5.2e+07  -6.5e-21  6.8e-21 
gdp_t~00 |   1.36e-25   3.54e-24     1.80   0.072   2.0e+11  -6.8e-24  7.1e-24 
gdp_ca~s |   9.51e-15   2.48e-13     2.16   0.031    .91036  -4.8e-13  5.0e-13 
pop_tr~l |  -1.34e-14   3.55e-13    -2.53   0.011   .723337  -7.1e-13  6.8e-13 
inv_g~00 |  -4.21e-15   1.10e-13    -2.17   0.030   21.1257  -2.2e-13  2.1e-13 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  obs. P |   .1034483 
 pred. P |   8.99e-16  (at x-bar) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    z and P>|z| are the test of the underlying coefficient being 0 
Result: Investment share is significantly lower. 
40 Kappel: On the Economics of Regional Powers 
.         *geographic dispersion of the population, gini; 
.         dprobit reg_power pop_tot_00 gdp_tot_00 gdp_cap_dis pop_trop_ll pop_gini_95 if 
d_oecd==0 & regio 
> n1!=., robust; 
Probit estimates                                        Number of obs =     81 
                                                        Wald chi2(4)  =      . 
                                                        Prob > chi2   =      . 
Log pseudo-likelihood = -7.5325426                      Pseudo R2     = 0.7334 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         |               Robust 
reg_po~r |      dF/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     x-bar  [    95% C.I.   ] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
pop_t~00 |   2.58e-09   2.20e-09     1.67   0.094   5.5e+07  -1.7e-09  6.9e-09 
gdp_t~00 |   4.15e-13   2.65e-13     1.74   0.082   2.1e+11  -1.0e-13  9.3e-13 
gdp_ca~s |   .0543765   .0404546     1.85   0.064   .908162  -.024913  .133666 
pop_tr~l |  -.0421339   .0916823    -0.45   0.652   .727463  -.221828   .13756 
pop_g~95 |   .1602023   .3040564     0.52   0.601    .62963  -.435737  .756142 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  obs. P |   .1111111 
 pred. P |   .0617253  (at x-bar) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    z and P>|z| are the test of the underlying coefficient being 0 
Result: No significant agglomeration effects. 
. *DEMOGRAPHIC DOMINANCE?; 
.         *fertility; 
.         dprobit reg_power pop_tot_00 gdp_tot_00 gdp_cap_dis pop_trop_ll fert_rate_00 if 
d_oecd==0 & regi 
> on1!=., robust; 
Probit estimates                                        Number of obs =     84 
                                                        Wald chi2(4)  =      . 
                                                        Prob > chi2   =      . 
Log pseudo-likelihood = -7.4494839                      Pseudo R2     = 0.7395 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         |               Robust 
reg_po~r |      dF/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     x-bar  [    95% C.I.   ] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
pop_t~00 |   1.87e-09   1.65e-09     1.62   0.105   5.3e+07  -1.4e-09  5.1e-09 
gdp_t~00 |   6.19e-13   3.17e-13     2.86   0.004   2.0e+11  -3.2e-15  1.2e-12 
gdp_ca~s |   .0507831   .0356541     1.79   0.073   .918007  -.019098  .120664 
pop_tr~l |  -.0760314    .106215    -0.72   0.469   .714534  -.284209  .132146 
fert_~00 |   .0313619   .0340759     1.05   0.294   4.12946  -.035426  .098149 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  obs. P |   .1071429 
 pred. P |   .0627135  (at x-bar) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    z and P>|z| are the test of the underlying coefficient being 0 
Result: Fertility level not important. 
Kappel: On the Economics of Regional Powers 41 
.         *distance to regional mean of fertility; 
.         dprobit reg_power pop_tot_00 gdp_tot_00 gdp_cap_dis pop_trop_ll fert_rate_dis if 
d_oecd==0 & reg 
> ion1!=., robust; 
Probit estimates                                        Number of obs =     84 
                                                        Wald chi2(4)  =      . 
                                                        Prob > chi2   =      . 
Log pseudo-likelihood = -5.1457648                      Pseudo R2     = 0.8201 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         |               Robust 
reg_po~r |      dF/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     x-bar  [    95% C.I.   ] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
pop_t~00 |   1.81e-10   4.78e-10     2.17   0.030   5.3e+07  -7.6e-10  1.1e-09 
gdp_t~00 |   6.94e-15   2.34e-14     0.91   0.362   2.0e+11  -3.9e-14  5.3e-14 
gdp_ca~s |   .0013167   .0041472     0.55   0.581   .918007  -.006812  .009445 
pop_tr~l |   -.006314   .0155511    -1.54   0.125   .714534  -.036794  .024166 
fert_r~s |  -.0205667   .0546797    -2.65   0.008   1.01889  -.127737  .086604 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  obs. P |   .1071429 
 pred. P |   .0010122  (at x-bar) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    z and P>|z| are the test of the underlying coefficient being 0 
Result: However, fertility level compared to the regional level seems to make a dif-
ference. 
. *CULTURAL DOMINANCE?; 
.         *international migration stock, total; 
.         dprobit reg_power pop_tot_00 gdp_tot_00 gdp_cap_dis pop_trop_ll mig_tot_00 if 
d_oecd==0 & region 
> 1!=., robust; 
Probit estimates                                        Number of obs =     87 
                                                        Wald chi2(4)  =      . 
                                                        Prob > chi2   =      . 
Log pseudo-likelihood = -6.4934488                      Pseudo R2     = 0.7756 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         |               Robust 
reg_po~r |      dF/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     x-bar  [    95% C.I.   ] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
pop_t~00 |   2.42e-09   2.08e-09     2.04   0.042   5.2e+07  -1.7e-09  6.5e-09 
gdp_t~00 |   4.20e-13   3.10e-13     1.88   0.060   2.0e+11  -1.9e-13  1.0e-12 
gdp_ca~s |   .0453805   .0436241     1.89   0.059    .91036  -.040121  .130882 
pop_tr~l |  -.1039997    .060936    -1.44   0.151   .723337  -.223432  .015433 
mig_t~00 |  -5.82e-08   4.57e-08    -1.50   0.133    637197  -1.5e-07  3.1e-08 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  obs. P |   .1034483 
 pred. P |   .0412269  (at x-bar) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    z and P>|z| are the test of the underlying coefficient being 0 
Result: Migration stock does not play a role. 
42 Kappel: On the Economics of Regional Powers 
.         *international migration stock (% population); 
.         dprobit reg_power pop_tot_00 gdp_tot_00 gdp_cap_dis pop_trop_ll mig_pop_00 if 
d_oecd==0 & region 
> 1!=., robust; 
Probit estimates                                        Number of obs =     87 
                                                        Wald chi2(4)  =      . 
                                                        Prob > chi2   =      . 
Log pseudo-likelihood = -6.9602055                      Pseudo R2     = 0.7595 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         |               Robust 
reg_po~r |      dF/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     x-bar  [    95% C.I.   ] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
pop_t~00 |   1.26e-10   5.82e-10     1.54   0.124   5.2e+07  -1.0e-09  1.3e-09 
gdp_t~00 |   3.20e-14   1.41e-13     1.71   0.087   2.0e+11  -2.4e-13  3.1e-13 
gdp_ca~s |   .0044811   .0198473     1.61   0.106    .91036  -.034419  .043381 
pop_tr~l |  -.0062235   .0255452    -1.10   0.271   .723337  -.056291  .043844 
mig_p~00 |  -.0023751   .0082263    -0.90   0.371   5.29541  -.018498  .013748 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  obs. P |   .1034483 
 pred. P |   .0024213  (at x-bar) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    z and P>|z| are the test of the underlying coefficient being 0 
.         *international tourism, number of arrivals; 
.         dprobit reg_power pop_tot_00 gdp_tot_00 gdp_cap_dis pop_trop_ll tour_arr_00 if 
d_oecd==0 & regio 
> n1!=., robust; 
Probit estimates                                        Number of obs =     81 
                                                        Wald chi2(4)  =      . 
                                                        Prob > chi2   =      . 
Log pseudo-likelihood =  -7.533864                      Pseudo R2     = 0.7334 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         |               Robust 
reg_po~r |      dF/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     x-bar  [    95% C.I.   ] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
pop_t~00 |   2.24e-09   1.95e-09     1.88   0.060   5.5e+07  -1.6e-09  6.1e-09 
gdp_t~00 |   1.84e-13   4.01e-13     0.52   0.606   2.1e+11  -6.0e-13  9.7e-13 
gdp_ca~s |   .0409834   .0363122     1.90   0.058    .92764  -.030187  .112154 
pop_tr~l |  -.0788527   .0685655    -0.96   0.337   .717553  -.213239  .055533 
tour_~00 |   9.76e-09   1.17e-08     0.73   0.468   2.0e+06  -1.3e-08  3.3e-08 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  obs. P |   .1111111 
 pred. P |   .0486402  (at x-bar) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    z and P>|z| are the test of the underlying coefficient being 0 
Result: Not significantly more tourists. 
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.         *distance to mean of international tourism, arrivals; 
.         dprobit reg_power pop_tot_00 gdp_tot_00 gdp_cap_dis pop_trop_ll tour_arr_dis if 
d_oecd==0 & regi 
> on1!=., robust; 
Probit estimates                                        Number of obs =     81 
                                                        Wald chi2(4)  =      . 
                                                        Prob > chi2   =      . 
Log pseudo-likelihood = -5.1133212                      Pseudo R2     = 0.8190 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         |               Robust 
reg_po~r |      dF/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     x-bar  [    95% C.I.   ] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
pop_t~00 |   5.16e-10   7.29e-10     1.53   0.126   5.5e+07  -9.1e-10  1.9e-09 
gdp_t~00 |   8.41e-14   1.61e-13     1.18   0.239   2.1e+11  -2.3e-13  4.0e-13 
gdp_ca~s |  -.0296892    .044459    -1.64   0.100    .92764  -.116827  .057449 
pop_tr~l |  -.0151415    .029223    -0.78   0.433   .717553  -.072417  .042134 
tour_a~s |   .0267663   .0344747     2.30   0.022   1.02404  -.040803  .094335 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  obs. P |   .1111111 
 pred. P |   .0083417  (at x-bar) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    z and P>|z| are the test of the underlying coefficient being 0 
Result: But significantly more tourists when compared to the regional mean. 
.         *growth of international tourism, arrivals; 
.         dprobit reg_power pop_tot_00 gdp_tot_00 gdp_cap_dis pop_trop_ll tour_arr_g if 
d_oecd==0 & region 
> 1!=., robust; 
Probit estimates                                        Number of obs =     78 
                                                        Wald chi2(4)  =      . 
                                                        Prob > chi2   =      . 
Log pseudo-likelihood = -6.9350229                      Pseudo R2     = 0.7514 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         |               Robust 
reg_po~r |      dF/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     x-bar  [    95% C.I.   ] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
pop_t~00 |   2.48e-09   2.16e-09     2.06   0.040   5.7e+07  -1.8e-09  6.7e-09 
gdp_t~00 |   4.27e-13   2.24e-13     2.37   0.018   2.2e+11  -1.2e-14  8.7e-13 
gdp_ca~s |   .0598324   .0437221     2.33   0.020   .916286  -.025861  .145526 
pop_tr~l |  -.0187734   .0847689    -0.22   0.827   .706718  -.184917  .147371 
tour_a~g |   .6579804   .3551351     2.13   0.033   .072609  -.038072  1.35403 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  obs. P |   .1153846 
 pred. P |   .0497896  (at x-bar) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    z and P>|z| are the test of the underlying coefficient being 0 
Result: More growth in tourist arrivals. 
44 Kappel: On the Economics of Regional Powers 
. *MILITARY DOMINANCE?; 
.         *length of the peace period since the end of the previous civil war; 
.         dprobit reg_power pop_tot_00 gdp_tot_00 gdp_cap_dis pop_trop_ll peace_dis if 
d_oecd==0 & region1 
> !=., robust; 
Probit estimates                                        Number of obs =     74 
                                                        Wald chi2(4)  =      . 
                                                        Prob > chi2   =      . 
Log pseudo-likelihood = -7.3422751                      Pseudo R2     = 0.7319 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         |               Robust 
reg_po~r |      dF/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     x-bar  [    95% C.I.   ] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
pop_t~00 |   2.64e-09   2.28e-09     1.70   0.090   5.7e+07  -1.8e-09  7.1e-09 
gdp_t~00 |   6.51e-13   3.18e-13     2.38   0.017   2.1e+11   2.8e-14  1.3e-12 
gdp_ca~s |   .0680725   .0456482     1.67   0.095   .953483  -.021396  .157541 
pop_tr~l |  -.0596619    .116773    -0.51   0.611   .715134  -.288533  .169209 
peace_~s |  -.0648602    .124916    -0.50   0.615   .987977  -.309691  .179971 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  obs. P |   .1216216 
 pred. P |   .0865237  (at x-bar) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    z and P>|z| are the test of the underlying coefficient being 0 
Result: Length of the peace period not important. 
.         *military personnel (% total labour force); 
.         dprobit reg_power pop_tot_00 gdp_tot_00 gdp_cap_dis pop_trop_ll mil_labfor_00 if 
d_oecd==0 & reg 
> ion1!=., robust; 
Probit estimates                                        Number of obs =     85 
                                                        Wald chi2(4)  =      . 
                                                        Prob > chi2   =      . 
Log pseudo-likelihood = -7.4398071                      Pseudo R2     = 0.7409 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         |               Robust 
reg_po~r |      dF/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     x-bar  [    95% C.I.   ] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
pop_t~00 |   2.37e-09   2.01e-09     2.00   0.046   5.3e+07  -1.6e-09  6.3e-09 
gdp_t~00 |   4.14e-13   2.26e-13     2.07   0.039   2.0e+11  -3.0e-14  8.6e-13 
gdp_ca~s |   .0565581   .0419363     2.23   0.026   .876539  -.025635  .138752 
pop_tr~l |  -.0116556   .0765781    -0.15   0.882   .716827  -.161746  .138435 
mil_l~00 |   .0163776    .010068     2.25   0.025   1.89651  -.003355  .036111 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  obs. P |   .1058824 
 pred. P |   .0494137  (at x-bar) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    z and P>|z| are the test of the underlying coefficient being 0 
Result: Significantly more military personnel. 
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.         *distance to regional mean of military personnel (% total labour force); 
.         dprobit reg_power pop_tot_00 gdp_tot_00 gdp_cap_dis pop_trop_ll mil_labfor_dis if 
d_oecd==0 & re 
> gion1!=., robust; 
Probit estimates                                        Number of obs =     73 
                                                        Wald chi2(4)  =      . 
                                                        Prob > chi2   =      . 
Log pseudo-likelihood =  -4.011254                      Pseudo R2     = 0.8529 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         |               Robust 
reg_po~r |      dF/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     x-bar  [    95% C.I.   ] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
pop_t~00 |   5.37e-14   3.91e-13     1.94   0.052   6.0e+07  -7.1e-13  8.2e-13 
gdp_t~00 |   2.45e-17   1.72e-16     3.24   0.001   2.3e+11  -3.1e-16  3.6e-16 
gdp_ca~s |   2.80e-07   2.42e-06     0.20   0.838    .91124  -4.5e-06  5.0e-06 
pop_tr~l |  -5.49e-06   .0000391    -3.21   0.001   .683977  -.000082  .000071 
mil_la~s |  -.0000142   .0000981    -2.81   0.005   .990568  -.000206  .000178 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  obs. P |   .1232877 
 pred. P |   3.85e-07  (at x-bar) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    z and P>|z| are the test of the underlying coefficient being 0 
Result: However, significantly less when compared to the regional mean. 
. *INSTITUTIONAL DOMINANCE? 
.         *voice and accountability; 
.         dprobit reg_power pop_tot_00 gdp_tot_00 gdp_cap_dis pop_trop_ll voice_acc_00 if 
d_oecd==0 & regi 
> on1!=., robust; 
Probit estimates                                        Number of obs =     86 
                                                        Wald chi2(4)  =      . 
                                                        Prob > chi2   =      . 
Log pseudo-likelihood = -7.6913119                      Pseudo R2     = 0.7332 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         |               Robust 
reg_po~r |      dF/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     x-bar  [    95% C.I.   ] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
pop_t~00 |   1.97e-09   1.79e-09     1.78   0.074   5.3e+07  -1.5e-09  5.5e-09 
gdp_t~00 |   4.04e-13   2.08e-13     1.99   0.047   2.0e+11  -3.3e-15  8.1e-13 
gdp_ca~s |   .0502224   .0341787     2.02   0.043   .884562  -.016767  .117211 
pop_tr~l |  -.0435944   .0706765    -0.59   0.553    .72012  -.182118  .094929 
voice~00 |  -.0122198   .0392987    -0.30   0.766   1.95791  -.089244  .064804 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  obs. P |   .1046512 
 pred. P |   .0510683  (at x-bar) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    z and P>|z| are the test of the underlying coefficient being 0 
Result: Level of institutions does not play a role. 
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.         *political stability; 
.         dprobit reg_power pop_tot_00 gdp_tot_00 gdp_cap_dis pop_trop_ll pol_sta_00 if 
d_oecd==0 & region 
> 1!=., robust; 
Probit estimates                                        Number of obs =     87 
                                                        Wald chi2(4)  =      . 
                                                        Prob > chi2   =      . 
Log pseudo-likelihood = -7.4451471                      Pseudo R2     = 0.7427 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         |               Robust 
reg_po~r |      dF/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     x-bar  [    95% C.I.   ] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
pop_t~00 |   1.45e-09   1.44e-09     1.53   0.125   5.2e+07  -1.4e-09  4.3e-09 
gdp_t~00 |   4.21e-13   2.16e-13     2.50   0.012   2.0e+11  -1.9e-15  8.4e-13 
gdp_ca~s |    .041327   .0302575     1.93   0.053    .91036  -.017977  .100631 
pop_tr~l |  -.0553903   .0635335    -0.88   0.379   .723337  -.179914  .069133 
pol_s~00 |  -.0405004   .0262937    -1.58   0.114   1.89782  -.092035  .011034 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  obs. P |   .1034483 
 pred. P |   .0420173  (at x-bar) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    z and P>|z| are the test of the underlying coefficient being 0 
Are regional powers even less stable? 
.         *growth of political stability; 
.         dprobit reg_power pop_tot_00 gdp_tot_00 gdp_cap_dis pop_trop_ll pol_sta_g if 
d_oecd==0 & region1 
> !=., robust; 
Probit estimates                                        Number of obs =     84 
                                                        Wald chi2(4)  =      . 
                                                        Prob > chi2   =      . 
Log pseudo-likelihood = -7.6732069                      Pseudo R2     = 0.7317 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         |               Robust 
reg_po~r |      dF/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     x-bar  [    95% C.I.   ] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
pop_t~00 |   2.08e-09   1.87e-09     1.78   0.075   5.3e+07  -1.6e-09  5.7e-09 
gdp_t~00 |   4.17e-13   2.17e-13     2.06   0.039   2.0e+11  -9.0e-15  8.4e-13 
gdp_ca~s |   .0466301   .0359214     1.81   0.070   .929073  -.023775  .117035 
pop_tr~l |  -.0497323   .0804631    -0.59   0.553   .725306  -.207437  .107973 
pol_st~g |   .0974119   .1021956     0.99   0.320   .013775  -.102888  .297711 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  obs. P |   .1071429 
 pred. P |   .0556012  (at x-bar) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    z and P>|z| are the test of the underlying coefficient being 0 
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.         *government effectiveness; 
.         dprobit reg_power pop_tot_00 gdp_tot_00 gdp_cap_dis pop_trop_ll gov_eff_00 if 
d_oecd==0 & region 
> 1!=., robust; 
Probit estimates                                        Number of obs =     87 
                                                        Wald chi2(4)  =      . 
                                                        Prob > chi2   =      . 
Log pseudo-likelihood = -7.6681909                      Pseudo R2     = 0.7350 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         |               Robust 
reg_po~r |      dF/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     x-bar  [    95% C.I.   ] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
pop_t~00 |   1.91e-09   1.74e-09     1.71   0.086   5.2e+07  -1.5e-09  5.3e-09 
gdp_t~00 |   4.65e-13   2.42e-13     2.22   0.027   2.0e+11  -8.6e-15  9.4e-13 
gdp_ca~s |   .0509089   .0382953     1.88   0.060    .91036  -.024149  .125966 
pop_tr~l |  -.0582427   .0753269    -0.74   0.459   .723337  -.205881  .089395 
gov_e~00 |  -.0310767   .0487559    -0.67   0.503   2.08862  -.126636  .064483 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  obs. P |   .1034483 
 pred. P |    .054319  (at x-bar) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    z and P>|z| are the test of the underlying coefficient being 0 
Result: Institutional levels do not play a role. 
.         *growth of government effectiveness; 
.         dprobit reg_power pop_tot_00 gdp_tot_00 gdp_cap_dis pop_trop_ll gov_eff_g if 
d_oecd==0 & region1 
> !=., robust; 
Probit estimates                                        Number of obs =     87 
                                                        Wald chi2(4)  =      . 
                                                        Prob > chi2   =      . 
Log pseudo-likelihood = -3.4529987                      Pseudo R2     = 0.8807 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         |               Robust 
reg_po~r |      dF/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     x-bar  [    95% C.I.   ] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
pop_t~00 |   5.51e-91   8.74e-89     2.26   0.024   5.2e+07  -1.7e-88  1.7e-88 
gdp_t~00 |   2.57e-94   4.08e-92     2.35   0.019   2.0e+11  -8.0e-92  8.0e-92 
gdp_ca~s |   2.81e-83   4.46e-81     2.30   0.022    .91036  -8.7e-81  8.8e-81 
pop_tr~l |   1.40e-83   2.23e-81     1.43   0.152   .723337  -4.3e-81  4.4e-81 
gov_ef~g |   7.77e-82   1.23e-79     2.33   0.020  -.007087  -2.4e-79  2.4e-79 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  obs. P |   .1034483 
 pred. P |   1.64e-85  (at x-bar) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    z and P>|z| are the test of the underlying coefficient being 0 
Result: Improvements of government effectiveness over time. 
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.         *regulatory quality; 
.         dprobit reg_power pop_tot_00 gdp_tot_00 gdp_cap_dis pop_trop_ll reg_qual_00 if 
d_oecd==0 & regio 
> n1!=., robust; 
Probit estimates                                        Number of obs =     87 
                                                        Wald chi2(4)  =      . 
                                                        Prob > chi2   =      . 
Log pseudo-likelihood = -7.3140101                      Pseudo R2     = 0.7472 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         |               Robust 
reg_po~r |      dF/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     x-bar  [    95% C.I.   ] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
pop_t~00 |   1.75e-09   1.67e-09     1.62   0.105   5.2e+07  -1.5e-09  5.0e-09 
gdp_t~00 |   4.48e-13   2.03e-13     2.28   0.022   2.0e+11   5.1e-14  8.5e-13 
gdp_ca~s |   .0498735   .0337891     2.02   0.043    .91036  -.016352  .116099 
pop_tr~l |  -.0273634   .0767237    -0.36   0.716   .723337  -.177739  .123012 
reg_q~00 |  -.0497822    .031175    -1.29   0.199   2.24621  -.110884   .01132 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  obs. P |   .1034483 
 pred. P |   .0465539  (at x-bar) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    z and P>|z| are the test of the underlying coefficient being 0 
.         *growth of regulatory quality; 
.         dprobit reg_power pop_tot_00 gdp_tot_00 gdp_cap_dis pop_trop_ll reg_qual_g if 
d_oecd==0 & region 
> 1!=., robust; 
Probit estimates                                        Number of obs =     84 
                                                        Wald chi2(4)  =      . 
                                                        Prob > chi2   =      . 
Log pseudo-likelihood = -6.5349829                      Pseudo R2     = 0.7715 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         |               Robust 
reg_po~r |      dF/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     x-bar  [    95% C.I.   ] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
pop_t~00 |   1.02e-09   1.03e-09     2.01   0.045   5.3e+07  -9.9e-10  3.0e-09 
gdp_t~00 |   3.03e-13   2.46e-13     2.46   0.014   2.0e+11  -1.8e-13  7.9e-13 
gdp_ca~s |   .0286693   .0234558     2.07   0.038   .929878  -.017303  .074642 
pop_tr~l |   -.035387   .0472266    -0.96   0.339   .713456  -.127949  .057176 
reg_qu~g |   .5987202   .4356082     2.34   0.019   .002759  -.255056   1.4525 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  obs. P |   .1071429 
 pred. P |   .0209053  (at x-bar) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    z and P>|z| are the test of the underlying coefficient being 0 
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.         *rule of law; 
.         dprobit reg_power pop_tot_00 gdp_tot_00 gdp_cap_dis pop_trop_ll rule_law_00 if 
d_oecd==0 & regio 
> n1!=., robust; 
Probit estimates                                        Number of obs =     87 
                                                        Wald chi2(4)  =      . 
                                                        Prob > chi2   =      . 
Log pseudo-likelihood = -7.5767693                      Pseudo R2     = 0.7382 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         |               Robust 
reg_po~r |      dF/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     x-bar  [    95% C.I.   ] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
pop_t~00 |   1.74e-09   1.70e-09     1.50   0.135   5.2e+07  -1.6e-09  5.1e-09 
gdp_t~00 |   4.50e-13   2.22e-13     2.18   0.029   2.0e+11   1.5e-14  8.8e-13 
gdp_ca~s |    .053088    .036857     1.92   0.055    .91036   -.01915  .125326 
pop_tr~l |  -.0648793   .0742382    -0.86   0.388   .723337  -.210384  .080625 
rule_~00 |  -.0473704   .0532224    -0.88   0.380   2.01644  -.151684  .056944 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  obs. P |   .1034483 
 pred. P |   .0531583  (at x-bar) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    z and P>|z| are the test of the underlying coefficient being 0 
.         *growth of rule of law; 
.         dprobit reg_power pop_tot_00 gdp_tot_00 gdp_cap_dis pop_trop_ll rule_law_g if 
d_oecd==0 & region 
> 1!=., robust; 
Probit estimates                                        Number of obs =     87 
                                                        Wald chi2(4)  =      . 
                                                        Prob > chi2   =      . 
Log pseudo-likelihood =  -6.784129                      Pseudo R2     = 0.7655 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         |               Robust 
reg_po~r |      dF/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     x-bar  [    95% C.I.   ] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
pop_t~00 |   1.59e-09   1.47e-09     2.06   0.040   5.2e+07  -1.3e-09  4.5e-09 
gdp_t~00 |   3.58e-13   2.13e-13     2.67   0.008   2.0e+11  -5.9e-14  7.8e-13 
gdp_ca~s |   .0368501   .0295371     1.98   0.048    .91036  -.021042  .094742 
pop_tr~l |  -.0360892   .0604434    -0.60   0.551   .723337  -.154556  .082378 
rule_l~g |   .7217335     .46582     3.16   0.002    .00017  -.191257  1.63472 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  obs. P |   .1034483 
 pred. P |   .0328313  (at x-bar) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    z and P>|z| are the test of the underlying coefficient being 0 
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.         *control of corruption; 
.         dprobit reg_power pop_tot_00 gdp_tot_00 gdp_cap_dis pop_trop_ll cont_corr_00 if 
d_oecd==0 & regi 
> on1!=., robust; 
Probit estimates                                        Number of obs =     87 
                                                        Wald chi2(4)  =      . 
                                                        Prob > chi2   =      . 
Log pseudo-likelihood =  -7.453967                      Pseudo R2     = 0.7424 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         |               Robust 
reg_po~r |      dF/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     x-bar  [    95% C.I.   ] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
pop_t~00 |   1.44e-09   1.39e-09     1.52   0.129   5.2e+07  -1.3e-09  4.2e-09 
gdp_t~00 |   3.79e-13   2.00e-13     2.34   0.019   2.0e+11  -1.3e-14  7.7e-13 
gdp_ca~s |   .0535999   .0325695     2.01   0.045    .91036  -.010235  .117435 
pop_tr~l |  -.0577413   .0707056    -0.86   0.389   .723337  -.196322  .080839 
cont_~00 |  -.0684608   .0558127    -1.14   0.256   2.01805  -.177852   .04093 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  obs. P |   .1034483 
 pred. P |   .0436727  (at x-bar) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    z and P>|z| are the test of the underlying coefficient being 0 
.         *growth of control of corruption; 
.         dprobit reg_power pop_tot_00 gdp_tot_00 gdp_cap_dis pop_trop_ll cont_corr_g if 
d_oecd==0 & regio 
> n1!=., robust; 
Probit estimates                                        Number of obs =     80 
                                                        Wald chi2(4)  =      . 
                                                        Prob > chi2   =      . 
Log pseudo-likelihood = -7.7215255                      Pseudo R2     = 0.7256 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         |               Robust 
reg_po~r |      dF/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     x-bar  [    95% C.I.   ] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
pop_t~00 |   2.50e-09   2.17e-09     1.83   0.067   5.6e+07  -1.7e-09  6.7e-09 
gdp_t~00 |   4.92e-13   2.50e-13     2.04   0.042   2.1e+11   2.5e-15  9.8e-13 
gdp_ca~s |   .0571013   .0404358     1.92   0.055   .928523  -.022151  .136354 
pop_tr~l |  -.0619785    .095325    -0.63   0.526   .699156  -.248812  .124855 
cont_c~g |   .0972092   .9841981     0.10   0.922  -.002346  -1.83178   2.0262 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  obs. P |      .1125 
 pred. P |   .0680575  (at x-bar) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    z and P>|z| are the test of the underlying coefficient being 0 
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